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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the determinants of the size of the hazelnut farms in Turkey
within the framework of the theory of firm and transaction costs. This study argues that,
for a farm production function, land is a complex input with many transaction costincreasing interactions with nature. Natural effects, such as land slope and variation in the
weather conditions, can increase transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs of
using the inputs necessary for production. This study utilizes two separate data sets in
order to test if the predicted relationship between transaction costs and farm size holds.
The first data set explores the individual characteristics of hazelnut farmers. The second
data set explores the regional farm characteristics across hazelnut production regions.
Based on the OLS and IV estimation results, it is found that holding other factors
constant higher land slope and higher variation in rainfall cause a decrease in the size of
the hazelnut farms.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Farms are firms. Their objective is to maximize profits and their input choices
must be in accordance with this objective. For agricultural firms, land is a complex input
with many interactions with nature that have crucial transaction costs and size
implications. In this context, this study argues that holding input prices constant across
the production sections, variation in transaction costs that come from natural effects
determines the farm size.
Although nature has been taken as given or “unobservable” for ordinary
production functions, and many farm production activities can be performed in
conditioned environments with modern techniques that can isolate the effects of nature,
the effects of nature on the farm production function and farm size should be explored. In
this regard, this study finds that higher land slopes and greater weather variation lead to
higher transaction costs and smaller size of hazelnut farms in Turkey.
Hazelnut farmers find smaller lands more efficient and this is not only due to the
productivity of the lands but also due to transaction costs, monitoring, and contractual
issues. Therefore, even though this has been the common approach to the issue, farm size
is not only about factor productivity (FP) of land but also total factor productivity (TFP)
and profitability. That is, the costs of a productive resource should include relevant
transaction costs in decision making. When the transaction costs are taken into account,
farmers prefer to own lands in size that they can handle by themselves with little or no
outside hiring due to high monitoring and contractual costs of non-family labor in the
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hazelnut farming. Besides, rain and land slope, particularly, increase the costs of using
non-land inputs and reduce the returns to managerial inputs employed by the farmer.
Land holdings per farmer may be influenced by land reform, land rushes, wars,
civil wars, and inheritance. Besides these exogenous shocks, there must be some internal
dynamics that are guided by economic incentives that affect the size of the land holdings
per farmer. Natural constraints, for instance, can limit farm size by affecting the
transaction costs, incentives, and thus choices made by farmers. This argument differs
from the explanations of risk that agricultural production is risky due to uncertainty of
weather conditions. Hazelnut farmers, similar to a portfolio choice, own properties at
different locations in order to minimize the risks imposed by the natural forces because
the probabilities are not distributed uniformly across the landscape. The scattering of
strips in 18th century English open field farming has the same risk-minimizing behavioral
aspects that farmers scattered and exchanged the strips to hedge against the risks of crop
loss and price changes (McCloskey, 1972). Besides the risks that they impose on farm
production, this study argues that natural effects can increase the associated transaction
costs. Fog, rain, wind, temperature variation, elevation, and land slope are measurable
natural effects that can increase the costs of using land and labor by increasing the costs
of monitoring, transportation, and coordination. Given its cost-increasing effects, suitable
weather and land conditions for farm production can be a matter of choice that is
reflected by the size of the land holdings. For instance, good (suitable) weather is an
input for farm production and farm-firms can choose the amount of good weather (less
variation and hence less risk and low transaction costs) through their size and location
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choices. Therefore, this study views the choice of land as the choice of nature since a
farmer can choose more or less of the properties of nature through the land choice.
Stable natural conditions improve contractual outcomes and better contractual
outcomes should lead to an increase in the farm size. When a farmer plans to buy a piece
of land in order to increase the size of his farm, he would prefer it to be in a region where
the weather is stable and land is relatively flatter. Another response of the farmers to the
natural (input) constraints is to apply adaptive cultivation. In high elevations, for
instance, hazelnut farmers plant low-yield but more cold-resistant hazelnut trees. By
doing so, farmers react against the constraints from the natural effects of their location
and arrange (delay) the timing of pollination and harvesting through the choice of
cultivar.
This study differs from mainstream farm size studies in two ways. First, so far,
farm size studies (Sen, 1966; Kimhi, 2006; Bardhan, 1973; Feder, 1985; Lipton, 1985)
have intensively analyzed the (inverse) relationship (IR) between productivity and farm
size. However, this study takes a detailed view into size, transaction costs, and
profitability. Second, most of the size studies (Kimhi, 2006, for instance) deal with
perishable annual or seasonal crops, such as maize and rice, while this study deals with
nut trees as “vulnerable assets” that require long term investment and thus special
contractual arrangements. Land size and agricultural contract studies (Tunali, 1993, for
instance) mainly focus on the land itself, yet ignore the crop properties. They usually
draw and analyze land data from surveys about multi-crop and multi-region, sometimes
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nationwide, farm activities. However, cash crops and nuts, for instance, are different in
nature and they may affect the structure of agricultural contracts and transaction costs.
Based on the practice of hiring hazelnut laborers on a lump-sum daily wage, the
study also shows that lump-sum or fixed pay schedules are not necessarily inferior to
piece-rate or tournament (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) settings. Moreover, based on the
repeated dealings between dealers and processors in the hazelnut industry, this study
argues that contracts are based on expected post-contractual performance rather than
strict and term-by-term monitoring and policing.
The study has policy implications for land reform, tax and subsidy policies, and
institutional arrangements that target to regulate the lease, transfer, and inheritance of
agricultural lands. This study argues that small farms may be welfare increasing based on
crop characteristics, natural effects, and labor market conditions.
The study is laid out as follows. Chapter two provides a detailed background
about the economic and organizational properties of the hazelnut farms and farming in
Turkey. Chapter three reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on firm size, with
applications to hazelnut farms of Turkey. Chapter four is allocated for specification of the
formal model. Chapter five is for data analysis and methodology. Finally, Chapter six is
allotted for the empirical analysis.

4

CHAPTER TWO
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTIES OF THE TURKISH HAZELNUT MARKET
A. Size of the Industry
The history of hazelnuts in Turkey’s Black Sea region goes back to 300 B.C. The
spread of hazelnuts from Turkey to the world started some 600 years ago. Up to
elevations of 750-1,000 meters, hazelnut plantations lie as a 20-30 mile lane off the
shores of the Black Sea from the province of Duzce on the West through Turkey’s border
with Georgia on the East. There are two hazelnut production areas based on productivity:
The First Standard Production Area (Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Trabzon, and Artvin) and the
Second Standard Production Area (Samsun, Sinop, Kastamonu, Bolu, Düzce, Sakarya,
Zonguldak, and Kocaeli). Turkey is believed to have a comparative advantage due to
weather and soil conditions such that the Black Sea coastal lane of Turkey is considered
as the best location for hazelnuts (Fiskobirlik; Hazelnut Promotion Group).
Eighty five percent of the hazelnuts are used in the chocolate industry, 15% in
pastry, and 5% are used in other use places (Fiskobirlik). Besides their unique flavor,
longer shelving time in chocolates gives a comparative advantage to hazelnuts relative to
alternatives such as peanuts and almonds.
Hazelnut farms in Turkey are small family farms. Three hundred ninety five
thousand family-farms deal with hazelnut farming and a population of 2-4 million have
interests in it (TUGEM, 2005; Hazelnut Promotion Group). The total hazelnut production
area in Turkey is 584,000 hectares (1.4 million acres) for the year of 2005 (Fiskobirlik).
These totals yield about 3.6 acres of hazelnut land per farmer. Table-1 shows the surface
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area and farm size figures that were collected from various sources for producing
countries. As shown in the middle column of Table-1, hazelnut farms in Turkey can be
categorized as “small” based on World Bank (2003)’s criteria of 2 hectare (1 acre =.4047
hectare) per farmer. They are also smaller than the hazelnut farms in Italy, U.S.A., Spain,
and France. According to results of the survey of this study, that questioned 99 randomly
selected farmers from 21 hazelnut producing sub-provinces of Turkey, family-farmers
own about 3.64 hectares (9 acres) of land on the average. It should be noted here that it is
normal to have varying figures as shown in Table-1’s middle and left columns since the
data collection dates vary. Also, the definition of the farmer is an ambiguous one because
the structure of the farmer-family is complex in the production areas, government data
bases might not be updated, and, more importantly, farmers do not report the actual land
holdings for the reasons that will be mentioned later in the chapter of data analysis.
Table 1. World Hazelnut Acreage (acres)
Country Surface Area*
Turkey
1,413,392

Farm Size**
0.98-2.47

Farms Size***
< 4.94 (58% of the farmers)
4.94-9.88 (25% of the farmers)
Italy
169,261
12.35-24.7
2.23 (FAO)
USA
22,238
37.05-74.1
64 (Hazelnut Growers Union)
Spain
55,102
4.94-9.88
N/A
France
6,177
17.29-24.7
N/A
(*) Fiskobirlik, 2005.
(**) Formed from Marti, Joan Tous. 2001. World Hazelnut Production. Acotanc
Papers. http://www.aoi.com.au/acotanc/Papers/Tous-1/Author-n-Text.htm
(***) Compiled from various sources.
As shown in Table-2 and Table-3, Turkey is the world’s leading hazelnut

producer with almost 80% (2001-2005 average) of world production, and the leading
exporter with the share of about 86% (2001-2004 average). The annual production of
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540,000 tons (2001-2005 average, Fiskobirlik) constitutes $2-3 billion of gross income
based on the price. The sharp drop in Turkey’s 2004 production share was due to a onenight frost that caused a significant crop loss. Italy follows Turkey in both production and
exports to the world markets.
Table 2. World Hazelnut Production Shares (in-shell, %)
Country
Turkey
Italy
United States
Spain

2001
80.22
12.64
4.40
2.75

2002
2003
81.88
81.88
13.42
9.54
2.01
5.41
2.68
3.18
Source: Fiskobirlik.

2004
69.79
19.49
5.85
4.87

2005
80.77
11.71
4.18
3.34

Table 3. World Hazelnut Export Shares (shelled, %)
Country
Turkey
Italy
United States
Spain

2001
92.38
5.01
0.82
1.79

2002
78.34
7.10
1.09
1.55

2003
86.38
10.43
1.63
1.56

2004
87.96
8.20
2.02
1.82

Source: Fiskobirlik.
B. Hazelnut Farming
Hazelnuts grow on the groups of bush-like branches that are about 6 to 15 feet
high. Forming rows in a lot, hazelnut groups contain 5 to 10 branches and they are about
6 to 10ft away from each other. It takes 5 to 10 years for a newly planted bush to come to
a full yield. A well-maintained hazelnut tree can live more than 20 years. There are about
ten different cultivars of hazelnuts and farmers adopt them based on the characteristics of
their land and region. The bush-like nature of the Turkish hazelnut trees distinguishes
them from the tree-like cultivars and relevant farming characteristics that take place in
Italy, Spain, and United States.
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Hazelnut flowers begin to pollinate in late November through early December.
Appropriate wind and temperature that affect pollination in this period is very essential
for the next year’s crop. The trees start to blossom in late February and early March. Crop
estimates, which are very crucial for the expected price, come in late March and early
April. The longer and harsher the winter, the higher the risks of a one-night frost that kills
almost all the hazelnut blossoms. Other main negative shocks to hazelnut crop are hot
tropical winds and drought during the late stages of the crop development. Besides the
random shocks, hazelnut crop is subject to periodicity.
Main farming tasks are planting, pruning, fertilizing, pesticiding, weeding,
picking, husking, and sun-drying of hazelnuts. Farmers plant hazelnut bushes during the
winter to develop new areas or to rehabilitate the diseased groups. While some farmers
prefer to form groups far from each other with fewer bushes, some prefer close groups
with crowded bushes. Bushes and sprouts in each group need pruning at least once a year
since pruning increases per bush nourishment from the soil and reduces the timing costs
of collecting hazelnuts from ground. Pruning requires special care in a sense that sprouts
should be cut short off the ground with special knives so that the next pruning would not
damage the hands of the farmers. Moreover, if the sprouts are not cut off short enough,
then they do not die completely and continue getting nourishment from the soil and hence
less nourishment goes to the productive bushes. Which spring or bush in a group should
be discarded is another area of choice where each farmer applies his own agricultural
knowledge. Therefore, pruning workers should be closely monitored and given directions
often. Hand-fertilizing is also subject to different timing and application methods of
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different farmers. While some prefer to apply fertilizers three times a year, some prefer
only once. Pesticiding and weeding are almost standardized tasks throughout the regions
in terms of timing and methods used. They have been almost totally mechanized in recent
years with the introduction of weed eater tools.
One of the most important and most labor consuming tasks of the hazelnut
farming is harvesting. Harvesting starts in mid-August depending on the elevation and
lasts till the end of September and even October in high-elevation regions. There are two
methods of harvesting: First, hand-picking of the nuts from the trees one by one
especially during the early stages of the harvesting. Second, hand-picking of the nuts
from the ground when they ripen and fall off the bushes with light shakes. There is no
effective mechanization used in this stage of farming due to terrain (high slope) and rainy
climate. While the survey results show that the highest slope of the hazelnut fields can go
up to 70 degrees in angle, weather data shows that maximum rain can reach up to 3,812
mm/m2 (mostly average of 1975-2004) in the hazelnut production regions (see Appendix
B). Therefore, almost all of the hazelnuts are hand-picked, and hence this requires
intensive use of labor and harvesting brings a huge seasonal temporary labor movement
to the region.
Harvested hazelnuts are piled up for a few days and husked by specific
machinery. Farmers contract out husking to a machinery owner based on an hourly rental
rate. After being husked, the in-shell hazelnuts are sun-dried for about 5-10 days
depending on the sunlight and non-rainy days on the yards of their farm houses. Then,
sun-dried in-shell hazelnuts are made ready for shipment as bags of 70-80kg. While some

9

farmers prefer immediate shipping of the output, some prefer to store them especially if
they have no immediate need of cash and do not know a trustworthy dealer to deposit it.
In addition to these mentioned main tasks, there are several carrying, loading, and
unloading activities that require use of labor or draft animals throughout the whole stages
of the farming. There are cases in which all of the carrying, loading, and unloading tasks
are performed by laborers since the slope can be too high to use even draft animals.
Therefore, it can be concluded that hazelnut farming in Turkey is a labor intensive one
that requires engaging in costly labor market related activities of searching, hiring and
firing, monitoring, instructing, and motivating the hired labor1.
C. Major Actors of the Industry
There are five major actors in the hazelnut industry of Turkey: farmers, laborers,
dealers, processors, and commissioner/exporters.
Farmers grow hazelnuts and sell them to Fiskobirlik, semi-public cooperative, or
private sector dealers after the tasks of husking and sun-drying. Hazelnut plantations are
usually family-owned farms rather than corporate-type of agricultural organizations.
Farmers also do not deal with retail sale of hazelnuts. Moreover, they do not carry a
brand name but reputation. They are large in number and very loosely organized if not at
all. According to the survey results of this study, farmer families consist of 3 working age
members that can and are willing to go to hazelnut fields on the average. They own 1 or 2
animals, usually a cow for dairy needs and a draft animal, if any. Of them, about 58% has
secondary employment; this makes the definition of the “farmer” an ambiguous one.
1

Light ATV (All Terrain Vehicle) type of tractors is likely to bring a technological change and substitute
labor in many tasks. They have been in use for about 5 years and their use is increasing rapidly.
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Twenty eight percent grows vegetables or fruits for income, 12% owns a draft animal,
49% has transportation, and 24% owns light tractors. Forty one percent employs hired
labor and 58% of the harvesting is done by family members. Only 26% received
technical support from the local agricultural office recently. Mean family income is about
$16,250, of which $7,300 is from the non-hazelnut sources.
There is no regular, specialized or institutionalized labor supply for the hazelnut
industry but temporary and unspecialized ones due to farmer-specific and time varying
farming applications. Hazelnut laborers come from the city population if the need for the
outside-hiring cannot be met by hiring neighbor-farmers, which is a highly preferable
source of labor. Neighboring fellow farmers require minimum instruction, monitoring,
and motivation. Mostly, they are not paid a wage but the labor is exchanged day for a
day. This practice is called imece. As it will be explained in detail below, the rest of the
farm labor is mostly hired temporarily using a daily-base-wage contracts rather than
piece-rate pay schedules. Harvesting brings a specific labor movement in addition to the
remote living family members that take their vacation and travel to their villages to also
take part in the harvesting that lasts about a month. Therefore, family oriented work force
shows a surge during the harvesting season. However, farmers, especially larger ones,
still rely on temporary seasonal hiring for harvesting. The survey results indicate that
farmers need to hire temporary harvesting workers to meet about 42% of their harvesting
labor needs. Besides migrating family members to the region, there is a huge labor
migration to the region from the southern provinces of Turkey to get a share from the
demand for harvesting labor.
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Dealers buy hazelnuts from the farmers and sell them in bulk to processors. They
turn retail transactions into the wholesale ones. They add nothing to physical product,
however, since they serve as “local agents” on behalf of the processors and complement
the formal credit market. As such, the industry keeps them as contractual safeguards.
Local agenst meet farmers’ financial needs during the off-season, and bad years, under
the promises of exclusive buying agreements. Combined with the failure of formal
financial markets, financial needs of the farmers put the whole industry within a chain of
debt and invite opportunistic behavior. Since most of the profits of the dealers depend on
the kernel (shelled to in-shell ratio), measurement costs and uncertainty also play a big
role.
Processors own small plants to shell the hazelnuts. They sell shelled hazelnuts to
domestic markets or commissioner/exporters in quantities of 10 tons minimum. They also
financially support the dealers in their financing of farmers. Some processors own
integrated facilities to whiten and roast hazelnuts. Processors are small in numbers.
Commissioners match processors and exporters. Comissioning is usually a singleperson business that operates with high daily transactions and cash flow. Daily markets
open around 11:30 a.m. every business day and local price is formed through the dealings
between processors and commissioners. Then, processors base their price offerings to the
dealers on those transactions that they finalize with the commissioners.
D. Potential Contractual Issues across the Industry
Contrary to its common worldwide application with many agricultural products,
land contracts or share tenancy is not common in the hazelnut industry of Turkey.

12

Therefore, contractual issues with sharecropping or cash contracts are not applicable
here. Labor intensiveness and limited use of machinery due to weather and terrain make
labor contracts more important regarding the contractual issues within the industry.
Contracts are costly due to bounded rationality, measurement costs, and
opportunistic behavior. Depending on these factors, the hazelnut industry operates with
less contractual problems as moved toward commissioning since the number of parties
gets smaller, transactions occur in large quantities, and contracts become written (mostly
due-to strict export inspections of government agencies). However, contractual
performance (Klein and Leffler, 1981) is lower when the transactions between the
farmers and dealers are the matter, since the number of parties gets larger; transactions
are in smaller quantities; and contracts are informal and based on proxies rather than
actual measurements of the crop quality and the trustworthiness of the farmers. A detailed
view can be taken into potential contractual issues among the agents of the industry as
follows:
i) Between Farmers and Dealers: As mentioned earlier, there are mutual debt
relations between the farmers and dealers. First, farmers may deposit their produce with a
known dealer with the promise of cashing it anytime. Second, dealers provide informal
financing to farmers when they need it in return for the promise of exclusive buying.
Then, the most common contractual issue between the dealer and farmers is the default of
each party. Farmers may fail to repay their financial obligations to the dealer due to either
a bad crop year or a deliberate cheating. Smaller farmers are more likely to cheat relative
to big ones since their cost of default, mainly the sunk cost of developing and protecting a
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reputation, is lower. They may invest fewer resources to develop a reputation due to low
returns to reputation while big farmers gain more from developing reputation than small
capacity farmers due to fixed costs. Given poor or mostly unavailable credit history,
smaller farmers can easily visit and cheat a different dealer each year and play a single
shot game. Considering the smallness of farm sizes across the industry, costs of
information, costs of congestion, and defaults are some of the major contractual issues.
Dealers also may fail to repay their obligations on the deposited crop of the
farmers due to either bankruptcy or cheating. Some farmers, usually bigger ones, may not
cash their produce and deposit them to the dealers. This is because farmers may (a) not
have an immediate need of cash, (b) want to wait and speculate against price fluctuations,
and (c) want to get rid of storing costs and risks, such as fire, flood, theft, and so on.
Most of the farmers usually prefer to deposit their produce if they know a trustworthy
dealer. Besides risks and pecuniary costs, hazelnut kernels will also shrink and lose
weight during their storage time. Hence, neither farmers nor dealers and processors keep
hazelnuts stored long term in their possession. Thus, the market economizes on the
storing costs and storing time is kept very short across the different stages of the market.
However, this depositing and economizing on storing costs leaves the hazelnut market to
operate on a chain of debt relations among the actors of the market and cause defaults.
Since there is no effective governmental price stabilization program that includes
a stock management program, a livrer buying agreements of the importers outside the
country and exporters inside the country (from processors) are common yet rather
speculative practices against the price fluctuations due to periodicity or supply shocks.
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Buyers simply get a crop estimate and take this as a base for the expected price, then
purchase enormously large quantity of “to be delivered” hazelnuts at the expected price.
This type of buying agreement also takes place between farmers and dealers and brings
high profits as well as chained bankruptcies and defaults depending on the actual price.
According to Food News (Nov. 21, 2003; 19 Feb. 2004), for instance, buyers of the
Turkish hazelnuts lost millions of dollars due to the defaults that resulted from the
differences between estimated-actual crop and estimated-actual price.
Implicit contracting that depends on promises, trust, and “indefinite guarantees”
rather than written agreements (Akerlof, 1970), is one of the most important reasons for
the defaults. While implicit contracting reduces the costs of contracting, it may also
reduce contractual performance. In the absence of explicit contracting, non-repeating
business, the lack of knowledge, and the last period problem are the main causes for the
defaults. For instance, dealers who plan to expand their market share and try to enter new
villages suffer from the lack of knowledge. Therefore, the entry comes with uncertainties
and requires a transition path, establishing trust, and gathering information about farmers
of the new region. They may be faced with several default cases during this transition and
expansion period.
Asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970) and information-measurement problems
(Barzel, 1982) are the other sources of contractual issues between the dealers and
farmers. Since farmers have more knowledge than the dealers about the quality of their
crop, they may behave opportunistically by shipping humid (heavier) or rotten hazelnuts.
Moreover, the probability of getting a loan and its amount mainly depends on the
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expected crop of the farmers. The higher the expected crop the higher the possible
amount of loan at outgoing rates. However, actual properties of the crops are uncertain
until the actual shipment is made. Farmers have more knowledge about their expected
production quantity and quality and they can use this knowledge opportunistically to get
good loans. When they fail to repay and it is real cheating, they may usually use “the bad
year” argument. Since the effects of nature on the farms (and farmers) are non-uniformly
distributed, the bad year argument helps the cheating farmer with justifying the “natural”
cause of the default in order to get rid of the consequences of default. Hence, dealers try
to get an estimate of crop quality and quantity for each client-farmer and region no later
than February or March each year to be able to lend securely. Reputation, especially
references and guarantors2, and price premium are safeguards for parties against cheating
at this stage of the market.
ii) Between Dealers and Processors: Processors can by-pass dealers by offering
higher wholesale prices directly to the farmers and leave no room for them to operate.
However, they prefer not to deal with farmers directly due to higher relative costs of
retail transactions and their need of dealers as local agents to collect and process
information about the farmers at a lower cost. Farmers need financial aid, pesticides, and
other working capital, and storage services as explained earlier. Therefore, dealing with
farmers requires year around transactions with them regarding their needs of financial
aid, working capital, and storage services. Processors refrain from dealing with large
numbers of farmers that come from remote villages and leave these services to the dealers
2

New client-farmers are usually required to bring along a reference or guarantor who is known to the
dealer.
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as local agents so that their costs of gathering information about farmers and building a
trust is lower. However, they sometimes free-ride on the services provided by the dealers
by offering wholesale prices to farmers which disturb their exclusive buying agreements
with the farmers. Since cities are compact, there are no substantial time and
transportation costs, which may prevent direct dealings between farmers and processors.
However, reputation, the lack of information about the financial structure, and the
trustworthiness of the processor limit the processors’ opportunistic behavior against
dealers. Moreover, while farmers would not prefer to deal with processors until a certain
price difference occurs on the one hand, processors would not deal with farmers until
their product amount reaches a certain level on the other.
Dealers usually offer higher (than the season averages) at the very beginning of
the season3 to secure themselves against the default of the farmers that might be caused
by the free-riderness of the processors on the services provided by the dealer. This is to
secure pay backs and induce farmers to pay their loans as soon as possible. It is because
of this practice that opening prices, that last about 3-4 weeks, are always higher and the
prices start to fall slowly by then. This practice of the dealers can well be considered as a
price premium (Klein and Leffler, 1981) paid by dealers to the farmers for not defaulting.
Measurement is another major contractual issue between processors and dealers
since it has a big effect on the profits of both parties. As noted above, kernel and overall
quality of the hazelnuts vary by region due to changes in micro-climate and soil quality.
Hence, both dealer and processor use the region as a proxy (Barzel, 1982) for the quality.

3

Farmers are to pay their loans back in the first month of market’s opening.
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Simply, the region of the farmer sends signals about the properties of his produce. If a
farmer, for instance, is from a high-elevation location where the hazelnut trees are
different and of a more cold resistant type, the industry knows that his crop is of a lower
quality.
Since the price premium paid for extra kernel quality is a big profit opportunity
for both dealer and processor, kernel measurement is an area of conflict between the
processor and dealer. Measurement of kernel is performed by the processor under inperson monitoring of the dealer in a tiny room furnished with mirrors all around to
monitor any movements of the parties. A main sample of about 20kg (45 pounds appr.) is
taken from each of the 80kg bags of the whole shipment that usually consists of 5 to 10
tons of unshelled hazelnuts. Then, another sub-sample of 500 gr. (about 1.1 pound) is
taken from the main sample. Sampling, hand-made shelling, weighting, and treating the
cynic and rotten hazelnuts, are subject to processors’ discretion and it provides the
potential for opportunistic behavior that aims to undervalue the kernel quality of the
dealers’ shipment4. Dealers also can behave opportunistically by mixing the bulk with
humid and low-quality hazelnuts bought from outside of their regular regions at lower
prices. This is to fool the processor who takes the region of the dealer as a proxy for
quality. This is also why Welch’s grape juice is made of grapes that are grown on farms
owned by Welch’s (as a cooperative) in order to minimize the opportunistic behavior and
measurement costs.

4

Dealers ship hazelnuts in 70-80kg (150lbs app.) jute bags. When they collect samples from each bag,
processors prefer to grab hazelnuts from the top of each bag rather than the bottom since the hazelnuts at
the top will weight lighter than the ones on the bottom. Thus, they aim to pay less kernel premium to the
dealers.
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Dealers can threaten processors by holding-up the stock and not shipping it when
the processors need it. As noted above processors need to maintain a load factor and
hence need a certain flow of shipment from the dealers. Otherwise, they would have to
keep a huge inventory and this is an integration question related to storage costs. This is
another reason for the existence of dealers in the market that processors prefer to deal
with.
In a repeating game setting, both the processor and the dealer set their
expectations on average product quality and average measurement quality. That is,
expectations rather than written terms of contracts may align incentives better in many
contractual issues among parties. Both reputation and repeating business protect the
dealer and processor against shirking and cheating. No party prefers to take the advantage
of measurement difficulties since the expected returns of repeating business attains a
higher value than one-time cheating. Hence, both processors and dealers gain from fair
trade. Akerlof (1970: 499) notes that, in general, sellers rather than buyers may bear more
of the risks and costs of one-time cheating.
iii) Between Farmers and Workers: The labor intensiveness of hazelnut farming
was mentioned above. While small farmers do farm tasks with their family-members,
relatively larger farmers and farmers who have secondary employment will need to hire
maintaining and harvesting workers. The two main contractual troubles that farmers face
regarding hired labor are shirking and hold-up.
The aforementioned daily-wage payment schedule offered to hazelnut workers
seems to invite shirking and requires momentary direct monitoring of the farmers at first
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sight. For harvesting, for instance, even though metering and performance measurement
(Alchian-Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982), such as weighting and counting of heavy bags
collected by each worker and assessing each row that a particular worker operates in, are
costly, a piece-rate rather than a lump-sum payment would indeed induce and force the
workers to work harder in terms of the amount of hazelnuts collected per day. However,
this incentive and forcing could lead workers to damage the hazelnut trees and leave
some uncollected hazelnuts behind. In order to collect more and thus earn more, they
would not turn each leaf and look for hazelnuts underneath, pick the visible and reachable
hazelnuts only and would not spend enough time for making sure that no hazelnuts are
left behind on the bushes. The time consuming procedures of a “clean” collection would
of course reduce the amount collected by a worker. However, not only the amount of
hazelnuts collected but also leaving no uncollected hazelnuts behind and taking care of
the trees are important for the farmer. While leaving hazelnuts uncollected reduces the
crop amount and requires extra collection work, damaging the trees may substantially
reduce the next year’s crop. Thus, a lump-sum or fixed payment schedule with close
monitoring has been a preferred way of hiring harvesting workers in the majority of
production areas. Sustaining this application shows that farmers calculate all the
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and benefits in their decision-making. More
importantly, it shows that lump-sum pay schedules are not necessarily inferior to piece
rate or tournament settings under all circumstances.
Harvesting laborers are organized as teams of 5 to 10 members with a team
supervisor. Monitoring is done by the supervisors who perform nothing but monitor the
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team members. They are paid twice of a regular worker for their monitoring task. Ownerfarmers monitor the monitor as residual claimants. Monitoring and other labor-related
transaction costs, such as coordination, motivation, and instruction costs, would be
extremely lower if the neighbor farmers could be hired. Hired labor, however, requires
often warnings over shirking, coordination, and giving instructions constantly.
Large farmers need the harvesting done in about a month since the rains start in
mid-September. This time constraint invites the hold-up problem of the temporarily-hired
harvesting workers. They usually break their promises of labor supply and switch to a
better offer in the middle of the time-constrained harvesting season. Written contracts,
reputation, repeat deals, and bonuses paid in advance to the team heads are the measures
that farmers take against this hold-up problem.
The above mentioned labor intensiveness of the hazelnut farming due to terrain,
climate, and labor related transaction costs lead farmers to prefer owning lands in a size
that they can handle worked by family members.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW
A. The Concept of Firm Size
Decades after Coase (1937), the firm, firm size, and the number of firms in an
industry still remain puzzles for economists. Since Coase (1937), firm size has been
explained by the marginal organizational costs and benefits of the expansion.
Diminishing returns to management, which is determined by organizational costs,
information about the value of the inputs, and input supply price determine the size of the
firms. In this view, the firm is a sorting and directing unit alternative to the market
mechanism.
Specialization, division of labor, size of market (Smith, 1776; Stigler, 1966;
Roumasset, 1995; Roumasset and Uy, 1987), risk (Knight, 1921), transaction costs
(Coase, 1937), market power (Kumar, et al. 2001), institutional effects (Kumar et al.
2001; Davis and Henrekson, 1999), and business cycles (Hodges, 1934) have been the
mainstream explanations for firm size.
Williamston (1967) put forward the hierarchical view and “loss of control” theory
of firm size that indicates expansion brings loss of control. Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
discussed metering costs, team production, residual claimant, and principal-agent
problems regarding economic organizations. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978)
stressed appropriable rents through the specialized assets, vertical integration, and holdup problems. Becker and Murphy (1992) focused on the coordination and motivation
costs on the matter. Barzel (1982) argues that measurement costs affect the contractual
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performance and organization of markets that the firm should be an efficient sorting
agent.
Lucas (1978) separates production technology and managerial technology, which
consists of variable skill or talent and diminishing returns to scale, or to span of control.
The allocation of resources involves, first, a division of labor between managers and
employees and, second, the allocation of factors across managers. Capital and labor are
not combined costlessly. What matters is the allocation of resources per manager instead
of per firm. Then, the firm is one manager, together with the capital and labor under his
or her control (p. 510). Changes in the wage rate will affect the decision to work for
someone else or managing. Higher wage rates, for instance, will increase the opportunity
cost of managing and marginal managers will become employees. This, in turn, will
increase the average size of firms (p. 518).
Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) discuss labor market dynamics as an explanation
for firm size. Den Butter, et al. (2001) argue that differences in firm size can usually be
explained by the heterogeneity of workers and enterprise. In particular, they point out that
the performance and size of the firm are influenced by aspects of human capital and
personnel management such as hiring costs, firing costs, search costs, wage policy,
training, job matching, and setting requirements for worker qualifications. Thus, even if
transaction costs are the same for different firms, their size may differ due to qualities and
qualifications of the incumbent workers (p. 21).
Davis and Henrekson (1999) took institutional views that institutional constraints
determine the firm size. Akerlof (1970) asserts that implicit contracting that depends on
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promises, trust, and “indefinite guarantees” rather than written agreements, reduces postcontractual performance. Kumar, et al (2001) proves that firms facing larger markets are
larger. They all argue that high capital-intensive industries, high wage industries, and
industries that allocate large resources into R&D tend to have larger firms. They, more
importantly, found that countries with better institutions, measured by the efficiency of
judicial system, have larger firms.
Lindbeck and Snower (2003) view the inter-factor complementarities that give a
rise to returns to scale and the associated transaction costs as the determinants of the firm.
In this view, the firm is a pool of factor complementarities. When different agents collect,
process, and share information at different stages within a firm, for instance, those agents
complement each other and increase the returns to scale.
Firm size matters for two reasons. First, it signals about the intra-firm efficiency;
firms have to operate at a size in which profits are maximized. This is reflected by the
average costs and economies of scale. The issue has been analyzed through the shape of
the AC (average cost) curve in a sense that only U-shaped AC curves are assumed to
yield a unique firm size while others leave the firm size undetermined. Optimum firm
size is assumed to be a profit-maximizing one. That is, when a firm is not operating at the
optimal size, it is not maximizing long-term profits even if it makes some profits.
Smallness of a firm’s size does not necessarily mean that the firm is operating
inefficiently. No matter how small or big a firm is, it can operate efficiently and there is
no formal limit on the size except for the optimality conditions and the size of market.

24

Second, given the size of a market, firm size determines the number of firms in an
industry. So far, the number of firms has been analyzed for the sake of market power or
the level of competition in an industry. However, the number of firms in an industry also
determines industry-level contractual performance since as the number of firms in an
industry increases so do the costs of coordination and congestion. There should be an
optimal number of firms which is determined by optimum size of the firms in an industry
that maximizes the industry-wide contractual performance.
There are various measures of the size of a firm. Output, budget, market share,
use of labor, and revenues can be used for specific uses. This study uses the land holding
per farmer as the measure of farm size. In fact, output also could be used for the same
purpose. However, output is directly related to productivity and cannot effectively reflect
the effects of nature on the size. For instance, irrigation, use of fertilizers and pesticides,
mechanization, use of labor, and high agricultural knowledge of the farmer can lead to
higher output from the same amount of land but they may be free from dynamic natural
effects.
B. Determinants of the Size of Hazelnut Farms
1. Transaction Costs and Diminishing Managerial Returns
For a production activity, transaction costs are the costs that are associated with
the use of productive resources and they determine the contractual choice. Why there is
no sharecropping in the hazelnut industry of Turkey, why harvesting labor is hired on a
daily fixed-rate wage rather than a piece-rate, why there is no futures market, what are
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the effects of these on the size of the land holdings? It seems transaction costs are the
common answer for these questions.
Figure 1. The Tax-Like Effects of Transaction Costs on Size
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Transaction costs act like a tax on the use of productive resources and limit their
use. This is also true for the use of land. The associated transaction costs are similar to
taxes imposed on land and limit the farm size. Figure-1 illustrates size-limiting tax-like
effects of transaction costs on a representative productive function of Q=f(E, L), where Q
is output, E labor, and L is land. The amount of land is measured along the horizontal axis
and ∂Q/∂L shows the marginal productivity of land holding labor, E, constant. Marginal
cost of land is the forgone rent, r=∂(RL)/∂L, where RL is the prevailing rental rates. A
farmer employs land until the marginal productivity of land equals the rental rate, which
occurs at E. The initial equilibrium amount of land is L1. When the associated transaction
costs τ are imposed, the frontier of marginal product of land net of transaction
costs,

∂Q
(1 − τ ) , will shift downward. To equilibrate the marginal productivity of land to
∂L

26

the rental rate, the amount of land used has to decline to L2. The new equilibrium occurs
at D with a deadweight loss of GDE.
One of the biggest chunks of the transaction costs in the production process
consists of the costs of contracting and the costs of contract enforcement. The structure of
a contract for a farm production is classified as share contracts, piece-rate contracts
(lease), or wage contracts. Paarsch and Shearer (1996) analyze profit maximization under
different pay schedules. As the components and contributions change frequently or entail
a variety of activities by the same worker, piece rate contracts are not applicable
(Cheung, 1983: 15-16). Which contractual arrangements will be chosen is determined by
transaction costs (Cheung, 1970; 1983).
Roumasset (1995) and Roumasset and Uy (1987) argue that different contractual
arrangements of operations of farm lands lead to different firms according to the degree
of specialization they facilitate between labor and various managerial functions.
Roumasset (1995) also extends profit maximization to organizational form by
considering profit maximization as equivalent to agency-cost minimization.
Tunali (1993) finds that monitoring costs, information about the parties, size of
the benefits of risk sharing, managerial contributions, trust and non-land inputs, such as
draft animals, are the determinants of the choice of sharecropping or rent tenants in
Turkish agriculture.
Leffler and Rucker (1991) provide empirical evidence from the timber harvesting
industry that selling standing trees is more profitable than harvesting the trees and selling
logs to the mill owner based on the transaction costs of the two alternatives. They also
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argue that relative size of the transaction costs regarding the two types determine the
choice over lump-sum or per unit pay schedules.
Coordination costs can be viewed as a type of transaction costs. Becker and
Murphy (1992) argue that given the efficiency of the markets and the quality of contract
enforcement, the limits to the division of labor, which raises productivity, are determined
by the costs of “coordinating” specialized workers who perform complementary tasks
rather than the size of the market as first argued by Adam Smith, and the amount and
extent of knowledge.
One of the organizational responses to contractual costs is vertical integration that
results in an increase in firm size. However, there is a large body of literature that
analyzes the market forces and contractual remedies that reduce the costs of contract
enforcement and remove the need for further organizational arrangements through the
alignment of incentives. Hill (1990) argues that in the long run the invisible hand of the
market mechanism will delete systematically-opportunistic agents depending on repeated
dealing, the importance of the future (discount rate) for the parties, uncertainty, limits of
reputation, and the efficiency of the markets in detecting and eliminating
opportunistically behaving agents.

He implies that transaction costs arguments for

internalization has been overstated.
Umbeck and Chatfield (1982), analyze the structure of contracts regarding the
transaction costs with a focus on risks and remedies that contracts bear. They particularly
point out that contracts can have some remedies; “the creditors’ remedies”, such as
collateral to reduce the risk of default.
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Klein and Leffler (1981) suggest increased market price, the price premium, as
one of the most influential market forces of contract enforcement. Relative price of a
good is a signal of investment in non-salvageable assets, brand name, and advertising.
Also, it assures contractual performance.
Jacoby and Mansuri (2004) find significant positive effects of supervision on
gross productivity of land cultivated by sharecroppers in Pakistan.
Cheung (1970: 52-54) states that different physical attributes of the assets and
relevant policing and monitoring costs affect the contract choice and allocation of
resources. He states:
“(T)he cost of policing investment in a tree, perennially ‘attached’ to the common
land, is high, whereas cattle are driven home at night (p. 53)”.
By the same token, both farm work on hazelnut plantations and the plantation
itself require close monitoring and policing. Therefore, farmers prefer lands in viewing
and hearing distances from their houses. This is why farm houses are usually located on
top of the hills with hazelnut fields usually lay down the valley in vertical strips.
How do the terrain and weather conditions affect transaction costs and
contracting? Most of the hazelnut farming tasks are time-sensitive and they are performed
outdoors. While variations in weather conditions increase the risks of crop loss each year,
they also reduce the stability of the contractual arrangements and increase contractual
costs. Harvesting, for instance, must be finished in a timely fashion, usually in about a
month, before the early rains begin in order to secure the quality of the sun-dried
hazelnuts. This short period of time invites opportunistic behavior of the temporary
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harvesting workers and the hold up problem. The temporary nature of the hazelnut work
and the related labor market imperfections attenuate contractual problems and increase
transactional and contractual costs.
In the areas where the variation in weather conditions is relatively higher, the
outdoor nature of hazelnut work requires revision of mostly oral wage contracts. Given
poor weather forecasting, when a farmer hires labor and if it rains, then the farmer and
workers have to wait for days or weeks for good weather to come back. This is also true
for partially rainy days that require make-ups on shiny days and influence fixed costs,
such as the costs of transportation and communication, are higher for partial work days.
As noted earlier, transaction costs or the costs of contracting determine what type
of organizational structure will be preferred for a particular production. Besides the
vulnerable asset nature of the hazelnut trees, one of the main reasons for the uncommon
practice of share tenancy in hazelnut farming in Turkey is the extreme variation in
weather conditions. Given the fixed rent regime tenants may justify low output, poor
maintenance, or damage to the property (trees) easily with weather conditions despite low
labor and other intermediate inputs employed on the fields.
Capital intensiveness and mechanization are considered to reverse the so called
inverse relationship. Large farms will become more profitable with the use of technology
and mechanization. Along with variable weather conditions, high land slopes prevent the
use of machinery in the Turkish hazelnut farming. This makes hazelnut farming a laborintensive one and limits the land holdings by increasing transaction costs. High-sloped
lands also increase the measuring-monitoring costs regarding wage contracts. Workers
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mostly camouflage their slackness and justify low productivity with high slope by
implying that high slope is preventing them from working harder. In fact, it is true that
high-sloped lands are costlier to work. However, the real question becomes, do workers
slow down the job more than what the slope requires? Therefore, this study argues that
these interactions, which are closely related to contractual and transactional issues,
between labor, terrain, and weather conditions shape the nature of the wage contracts and
affect the size of hazelnut farms in Turkey.
Finding direct measures for transaction costs is not an easy task. Therefore,
proxies are used for this purpose. Evenson, et al. (2000) proxied transactions costs by the
levels of urbanization and access to markets and found that village level transaction costs
increase the intensity of supervision for all types of farming tasks. Moving from the idea
that richer countries are located in the temperate areas and they have larger farm size,
Eastwood, et al. (2004) took latitude as a proxy for the effects of agro-ecological
variation or geography. They detect a roughly U-shaped relationship between average
farm size and quadratic and linear latitude (p. 10,11).
2. Market Power
Lack of competition in an industry may affect the firm size. If it gains enough
market power, a firm simply limits itself in size (measured by output) in order to collect
the monopoly rents. Moreover, if there are effective barriers to entry in an industry, a
firm can expand to the limits of the market. Kumar et al. (1999) finds that utility firms are
larger because they enjoy officially sanctioned monopoly.

31

Firm size and the market power relationship can have different variations. Mariuzzo,
et al. (2003) argues that compared to multinational ones that operate across most stores
and products, small firms may have localized power within the stores and market
segments they operate in even if they cover less of the market.
3. Productivity
Smaller farms are found to be more land-productive (Sen, 1962; Feder, 1985)
because of the higher land to labor ratio with smaller lands. This famed inverse
relationship (IR) is only about land productivity and in a broader context of productivity
considers total factor productivity (TFP). Output per unit of land is not independent from
output per unit of labor or labor productivity. Therefore total factor productivity should
also be taken into account when the link between farm size and productivity is analyzed.
Smaller farms use land more intensively (Newell, et al. 1997; Banerjee, 1985). Intensive
use of land and resulting higher output to land ratio are due to traditional technology and
relatively cheaper (low-shadow priced) family labor.
When Cheung (1968) suggested smaller and smaller lands for each tenant in order
to increase the total amount of (integrated) rent from a parceled land, he had diminishing
marginal productivity in his mind. If a landowner parcels his land among a number of
tenants, he captures the higher marginal productivity with smaller lands and collects
larger total rent relative to a single unit of land rented away or cultivated by him (for
details and graphical illustrations see p. 110-113).
Land quality also has impacts on farm size. Given the amount of labor, with highquality but smaller lands, farmers can produce the same output as larger lands. The
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Malthusian explanation of the higher productivity of smaller lands suggests that more
fertile farms will eventually be, on average, smaller in more fertile regions. Modern
technology, capital intensiveness and mechanization, irrigation, and industrialization
make larger farms more productive (Deolalikar, 1981; Cornia, 1985). Cornia (1986) finds
supportive evidence for the positive relationship between farm size and labor
productivity.
The effects of productivity on farm size also have many controversial aspects.
Verma and Bromley (1987) summarize these aspects as conceptual problem, which deals
with the efficiency criteria to be used; empirical problem, which deals with data
difficulties, aggregation, heterogeneity, and functional form; and institutional problem,
which focuses on the organizational and ownership structure of the farms and farm size.
They argue that the findings, such as in Andrew, et al. (1997); Bhalla and Roy (1988),
about the relationship between the farm size and productivity can go either way
depending on the treatment over the mentioned three problems.
4. Policies and Institutional Effetcs
Tax and subsidy policies may provide incentives to expand or limit land holdings
based on their structure. Taxes that are levied on land area, farm income, rent, or produce
have various size effects depending on their rate structure (fixed, progressive, regressive,
etc.) and transferability among the agents of the industry. Similarly, subsidies also affect
land size based on their structure. If the transfer payments to farmers are based on the
land size, then farmers may expand land holdings in order to receive more transfers. The
target subject and rate structure of the subsidies will have various effects as well as taxes.
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Since tax and subsidy policies affect all the sections and there are no variations between
and within the sections, complex detailed effects of different tax and subsidy policies will
be ignored here.
Governments may limit farm size by imposing legal restrictions on the ownership,
transfer, leasing, rental rates, and inheritance of agricultural lands. The Turkish Cabinet,
for instance, released the decree number 2001/3267 in order to limit the production areas
and output quantity of hazelnuts. Decree number 2001/3267 permitted hazelnut
production locations and forbids hazelnut farming (i) outside the permitted areas, (ii) on
1st class agricultural lands5, 2nd class agricultural lands, and 3rd class agricultural lands
slopped less than 6%, and (iii) at elevations higher than 750m. The decree suggests
Alternative Crop Support Program for existing hazelnut farming on the 1st class, 2nd class,
and 3rd class agricultural lands slopped less than 6%. The decree has not been
implemented effectively due mainly to political economic reasons that allow farmers to
keep their trees in forbidden areas and lands. Therefore, there has been no shrinkage
observed in the areas of hazelnut production.
Turkish Soil Protection and Land Use Law (#5578 RG09/Feb/2007) puts
restrictions on inheritance, transfer, sale, and parceling of agricultural lands such that
most of the listed agricultural lands cannot be parceled into pieces smaller than 2 hectares
(5 acres). However, the law assumes exceptions for special soil and climate-requiring
crops of tea, hazelnuts, and olives so that their sizes can be smaller than 2 hectares based
on the evaluation of the relevant ministry. The 2-hectare limit is above the average land
5

Classification is based on soil based on the need of inputs other than soil, such as irrigation. 1st, 2nd, and
3rd class agricultural lands are the ones suitable for soil based farming.
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holdings per farmer in hazelnut farming in Turkey. However, this ruling and institutional
development is quite new for this study.
5. Input Constraints and Elasticity of Substitution
The assumption of convexity of the isoquants to the origin implies that there
should be an optimal input mix rather than utilizing just one input for the whole
production. Consider following production function:
Q = f ( E , L)

(1)

Where Q denotes output, E labor, and L land. By definition, f E =

fL =

∂Q
> 0 and
∂E

∂Q
> 0.
∂L

Q = fE E + fL L

under C.R.S .

(2)

Totally differentiating 2 yields:

dQ ≡ f E dE + f L dL ≡ 0

(3)

dE
f
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The expression of 4 implies that when f E =

f E ≠ 0 the slope of the isoquant,

∂Q
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∂L
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∂Q
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, is negative. f E =
> 0 and f E =
>0
dL
∂E
∂E

suggest that adding more of either inputs will increase output. Then, is it preferable to use
only one input as adding more of it will increase the output? More specifically, should a
farmer stop using only land? The answer is yes due to assumption of convexity of the
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isoquants that marginal value of one of an input declines as more of it is used relative to
another. That is, second partials are negative, f EE < 0 and f LL < 0 . Specifically for a farm
production function, there must be a limit to land size. Cultivating more land for a farmer
becomes inefficient against using labor because adding more labor to land will increase
the marginal productivity of land, as shown below with the second cross partial of land
and labor, in which land is held constant in the short run:

f LE = − f EE

dE
>0
dL

(5)

The assumption of convexity in expression (5) sheds light on almost all sizerelated productivity analyses that there must be an optimal mix of inputs that are guided
by the elasticity of substitution, which is the curvature of the isoquant,

fE fL
.
Qf LE

a. Labor Market Imperfections
Many contractual problems that limit the farm size in the hazelnut industry arise
from labor market imperfections. Hazelnut farming is mostly farmer-specific and this
specificity is transferred to the family labor force easily over the time. While some
farmers pay too much attention to the shortness of the cut sprouts, others may not care
about it that much. While many prefer large number of branches in a group, many others
prefer 5 to 10 of them. When a worker is hired for a hazelnut task, the owner-farmer has
to instruct all these and similar specifications to each worker and motivate them each
time. Motivation costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Nooteboom, 1993; Becker and
Murphy, 1992) for temporary city-workers are higher relative to family-members and
neighbor-farmers. Besides, hazelnut trees are vulnerable assets and require special care
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and treatment in order to protect their value. Therefore, stuck with high-slope lands that
are not suitable for the use of machinery, hazelnut farmers need specialized and timely
labor, which only could be found from the neighbor farmers or their own households. No
worker chooses to specialize and invest human capital resources into a non-standardized
and highly variable job. Thus, there is no formal and stable labor supply for hazelnut
farming such that the farmer calls up a labor company and hires workers whenever he
needs. These imperfections of the labor supply for hazelnut farming force the ownerfarmers to rely on family labor and this in turn limit the farm size. That is, larger farm
sizes should be expected where the family labor force is also larger. Sen (1962, 1966)
translates these imperfections into cost terms that consist of transportation costs,
efficiency wage, and search costs, which arise from the difference between the
opportunity cost of family labor and the wage of hired labor (the Sen’s wedge).
If there are constraints on the supply of the inputs or input supply is inelastic, then
the firms may adjust their size or substitute inputs depending on the elasticity of
substitution. Elasticity of substitution or the curvature of the isoquants, ties the use of one
factor to another. While lower elasticity of substitution means tighter substitubility,
higher elasticity of substitution means easier substitubility. Leontief production functions
with zero elasticity of substitution, for instance, require fixed proportional use of each
factor in production. Given the land size, farmers can substitute labor with machinery in
order to increase total factor productivity and reduce labor-associated transaction and
contractual costs. Thus, elasticity of substitution between both land and labor and labor
and machinery plays its role in determining the size of land holdings. Since high-slope
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terrain prevents the intensive use of machinery and reduces the elasticity of substitution
between labor and machinery, labor constraints remain as one of the crucial determinants
of the farm size in the hazelnut industry of Turkey.
Farm household is segregated into three different labor regimes, labor sellers,
labor buyers, and labor self-sufficient. These three regimes come with their own
contractions and efficiency disadvantages. Sadoulet, et al. (1998) uses this segregation in
order to identify the differential labor productivity and the effects of supportive elements,
such as access to tractor and animals, irrigation, and bank loans, on farm production. For
this study, however, the constraints or relative efficiency disadvantages of the three
regimes affect the size of the land holdings.
b. Locally Inelastic Supply of Land
In the short run, land is almost everywhere supplied inelastically “locally”. In
particular, there is always a piece of hazelnut land available to buy for a farmer if he
plans to increase the size of his farm. However, farmers prefer their land to be in viewing
and hearing distances which is consistent with Cheung’s (1970) argument about walnut
trees and cattle. Moreover, transportation costs are higher with the remote lots. The
survey results show that the largest lots owned by the Turkish hazelnut farmers constitute
only 50% of the whole holdings on average and the largest lots are 1.7 mile6 away from
the farmer’s residence on average. A “farm” usually represents an agricultural land that
the owner-farmer lives on; however in the Turkish hazelnut farming farmers own lots at
different locations and their residence is on one of the lots. Farmer families are mostly
6

The survey data do not report information on how many different lots a farmer owns, how disperse they
are, and what their shares in the total holding are.
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tied to their residence; hence a land sale in the neighborhood is a quite rare phenomenon.
This local inelasticity of land supply may also limit farm size that farmers may not prefer
buying remote lands due to associated transaction costs.
c. Credit Constraints
Hazelnut farmers need financial assistance for both consumption needs and
working capital to invest for the next crop during the winter and bad years. If the farmers
do not have access to credit markets when they are needed, they will not be able to make
investments for the next year’s crop and keep this lack of the input market in mind in
their size choices.
Farmers have basically two alternatives to get a loan. First, there is formal or
regulated credit offered by either private and public banks or public sector organizations,
such as the agricultural chamber or agricultural credit cooperatives. Second, informal
credit is offered by private sector dealers. Bell et al. (1997) found in a study on rural
Punjab farming, that many households fail to get credit offers due to pervasive rationing
in the formal market. Moreover, they argue that despite enormously higher interest rates
of the informal market, low elasticity of demand for credit, pervasive rationing in the
formal market and opportunities of tying output market to the credit market, which
enables farmers to pay with produce, unregulated borrowing make informal borrowing
more attractive. While this is also true for the hazelnut farmers in Turkey, depending on
the size of the land holding, trust, and repeated business, important reasons for the
additional attractiveness of the informal market are (i) the low transaction costs on top of
the interest rate of borrowing such that farmers can walk-in and borrow cash in minutes
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with no paperwork from a known dealer, (ii) the milder consequences of default relative
to harsh and mostly foreclosure-ending formal market, and (iii) high probability of
renegotiation. The transaction costs argument that is applicable to hazelnut farming of
Turkey is very similar to Indian village local money lending as cited in Akerlof (1970:
499, 500):

“…He (local moneylender) is always accessible, even at night; dispenses with
troublesome formalities, asks no inconvenient questions, advances promptly, and if
interest is paid, does not press for repayment of principal. He keeps close personal touch
with his clients, and in many villages shares their occasions of weal or woe. With his
intimate knowledge of those who would otherwise get no loan at all. [Parenthesis
added].”
A Hong Kong fishing village small shopkeeper’s remarks cited in Akerlof (1970:
499) also are in the same line:

“I give credit to anyone who anchors regularly in our bay; but if it is someone I
don’t know well, I think twice about it unless I can find out all about him.”
It should be noted here, however, that the local moneylenders in the hazelnut
industry of Turkey are not mere cash stores. They deal with real hazelnut business and
lend money on exclusive selling promises. It seems being a local agent of the dealers
plays the key role concerning local money lending in the hazelnut industry despite higher
rates of interest relative to formal credit market. Akerlof (1970) explains higher interest
rates relative to formal market with local moneylender’s (i) easy enforcing of his
contracts, and (ii) personal knowledge of the character of the borrower.

40

Kochar (1997) implies that because of superior input, such as irrigated land,
owners enjoy the access to formal credit markets and access to formal credit markets does
not affect either the amount of land leased or tenurial status. Moreover, many small sized
farms need not borrow from any outside source and small amounts that are necessary to
finance working capital may be available at relatively lower cost from informal sources
such as relatives, friends, and other fellow farmers. Therefore, access to formal credit is
low valued and lack of access to formal credit does not constrain households in their
working capital requirements, and hence should not affect the farmer’s production
decision. Kochar’s (1997) arguments about limited need for outside financial assistance is
not realistic for hazelnut farming in which only one crop is harvested in a year and
periodicity can put farmers in long term need of financial assistance. One can expect
limited need of financial assistance for the farmers when they grow a few crops
seasonally in a year and when there is no periodicity. This again shows that intensively
focusing on the land per se or another input in agricultural studies yet ignoring the type of
crop and its properties can be misleading.

6. Other Reasons
Hazelnut farming may not take the whole working time of farmers and thus they
can allocate some of their time to alternative employment. Sixty one percent of the
farmers in our survey have secondary occupations besides hazelnut farming. There are
farmers who migrated to big cities for job opportunities but kept their hazelnut lots. If the
productivity of these remote and part-time farmers is smaller is a question that is tested in
the empirical section of this study. Remote or part-time hazelnut farmers cannot only be
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explained by risk averseness that farmers allocate their labor time in different
employment areas in order to minimize the losses from unexpected shocks, such as bad
weather. The tree-nut nature of hazelnuts allows farmers to take alternative jobs since
trees do not need daily care. Then, the availability of additional income sources at lowopportunity costs should reduce the need for gaining extra land and limit the size of
holdings.
High risk that comes from natural effects, such as extreme variation in weather
conditions and one-night frost, may limit the farm size. In addition to transaction costs
explanations, this is why this study argues that variation in weather conditions will reduce
the size of the hazelnut farms. The availability of a crop insurance to compensate loss due
to weather risks might increase farm size.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE MODEL
Imagine a hazelnut farm owned by a family with a household of M working
members and a family supervisor, F. The household owns and operates A acres of land
with no rental land operated or rented out. Output, Q, is a function of the area cultivated,

A, and effective labor, L. No capital is assumed for simplicity. Effective labor L depends
on productivity or effort exerted by working family members, ef, and efforts exerted by
hired labor, el, M, and the number of hired labor, N. While the effort ef depends on
supervising ability, F, over M, el depends on the supervising ability of K over N. The
hired supervisor K is subject to F. That is, F denotes the ability of the “monitor’s
monitor” or the “residual claimant”. Land slope, s, variation in weather conditions, v, and
the area farmed, A, are the other determinants of both ef and el. Let e* denote the
maximum amount of effort that can be exerted by either a family member or hired labor.
Then, the effective labor of family members, ef:
ef (F) = F(M, A, s, v)

lim

e f ( F ) = F ( M , A, s , v ) → ∞

e f ≅ e*

lim

e f ( F ) = F ( M , A, s , v ) → 0

ef ≅ 0

(1)

As the monitoring ability of the family head goes to infinity, the effective labor of
the family will become equal to maximum possible effort by family members. As the
monitoring ability of the family head approaches to zero so will do the family effective
labor.
The effective labor of the hired labor, el, in which the hired supervisors are
subject to monitoring ability and activities of the family head, is:
el ( F ) = F {K ( N , A, s, v)}

lim

el ( F ) = F {K ( N , A, s , v )}→ ∞
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el ≅ e*

lim

el ( F ) = F {K ( N , A, s , v )}→ 0

el ≅ 0 (2)

As the monitoring ability of the family head over the hired supervisor goes to
infinity, the effective labor of the hired labor will become equal to maximum possible
effort. As the monitoring ability of the family head over the hired supervisor approaches
to zero, the effective labor of the hired labor will also approach zero as well.
The number of family members and number of hired supervisors are a decreasing
function of the supervising abilities of the family head. That is,

∂F
∂F
< 0,
< 0 . The
∂M
∂K

number of hired workers is also a decreasing function of number of hired supervisors.
That is,

∂K
∂F
∂K
< 0 . Note that it is assumed
><
. That is, monitoring the family labor
∂N
∂M
∂N

force may have lower or higher costs than the costs of monitoring the hired labor by the
hired supervisor7.
Then, the combined effective labor:
(3)

L = A ⋅ [ M ⋅ e f ( F ) + N ⋅ el ( F )]

Output is a function of land area, A, and effective labor, L:

Q = Q ( L, A )

(4)

Rewriting 4 in terms of 3 yields:
Q = Q (A ⋅ [ M ⋅ e f ( F ) + N ⋅ el ( F )]; A)

(5)

Output per acre of land can be expressed as:

7

Family labor may not necessarily be easier to monitor or more effective relative to the hired labor due the
free-riderness in the family (Peters et al. , 2004; Becker, 1981; Becker, 1988) and institutional slackness,
such as the difficulty of firing a family member.
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 A ⋅ [ M ⋅ e f ( F ) + N ⋅ el ( F )] A 
Q
= Q
; 
A
A
A

= q[ M ⋅ e f ( F ) + N ⋅ el ( F )]
Where, q =

(6)

Q
∂q
with
< 0.
∂A
A

Family farmers are faced with the following cash constraint, C, for their
production:
C ≥ wl ( s, v) ⋅ N ⋅ A + wk ( s, v) ⋅ K ⋅ A + a ( s, v) ⋅ A + g ⋅ M

(7)

Where, wl ( s, v) denotes the market wage for hired labor, wk ( s, v) denotes the
wage rate for the hired monitorer and team head, a ( s, v) denotes for intermediate input
costs per acre, and g denotes for consumption expenditures per family member. Note
that

∂wl
∂wl
∂a
∂a
> 0,
> 0,
> 0,
> 0 , and wk ( s, v) > wl ( s, v) . That is, land slope and
∂v
∂s
∂v
∂s

weather variation call for higher wage rates and higher costs of intermediate inputs.
At the outgoing price of P, now we can formulate a profit maximization equation
for the farmer as follows:
maxπ = P ⋅ A ⋅ q[M ⋅ e f (F ) + N ⋅ el (F )] − [wl (s, v) ⋅ N ⋅ A + wk (s, v) ⋅ K ⋅ A + a(s, v) ⋅ A + g ⋅ M ]
A, N

(8)

Equation 8 is constrained by A ≥ 0, N ≥ 0, s ≥ 0 , and v ≥ 0.
Then, the profit maximizing amount of land can be found as follows:

(

) (

 ∂ LM / A ∂ LN / A
∂π
= P ⋅ q[ M ⋅ e f ( F ) + N ⋅ el ( F )] + P ⋅ A ⋅ q′ ⋅ 
+
∂A
∂A
 ∂A

)  − [w (s, v) ⋅ N + w (s, v) ⋅ K + a(s, v)] = 0 (9)



Where LM = A ⋅ M ⋅ e f ( F ) and LN = A ⋅ N ⋅ el ( F ).
Then, the profit-maximizing amount of land, A*, is:
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l

k

A* =

=

P ⋅ q[ M ⋅ e f ( F ) + N ⋅ el ( F )] − [wl ( s, v) ⋅ N + wk ( s, v ) ⋅ K + a ( s, v)]

(

) (

 ∂ LM / A ∂ LN / A
P ⋅ q′ ⋅ 
+
∂A
 ∂A

) 



P ⋅ q[ M ⋅ e f ( F ) + N ⋅ el ( F )] − [wl ( s, v) ⋅ N + wk ( s, v) ⋅ K + a( s, v)]
∂e

∂e 
P ⋅ q′ ⋅  M ⋅ f + N ⋅ l 
∂A
∂A 


(10)

The main theoretical interest of this study is the effects of the land slope, s, and weather
variation, v, on the profit maximizing farm size, A*, and it can be shown as follows:

∂A *
=
∂s

  ∂q ∂e f
∂e f

∂w k
∂e 
∂a  
∂q ∂e l   ∂w l
+
−
⋅N +
⋅K +
⋅ P ⋅ q ′ ⋅  M ⋅
+ N ⋅ l 

 P.


∂e l ∂s   ∂s
∂s
∂s  
∂A
∂A 
  ∂e f ∂s

2


∂e f

∂e  
+ N ⋅ l  
 P ⋅ q ′ ⋅  M ⋅
∂A
∂A  



 ∂e 
 ∂e  
 ∂ f 
∂ l  
(P ⋅ q[M ⋅ ef (F) + N ⋅ el (F)]−[wl (s, v) ⋅ N + wk (s, v) ⋅ K + a(s, v)])⋅ P⋅ q′ ⋅  M ⋅  ∂A  + N ⋅  ∂A  
∂s
∂s





 < 0. (11)
−
2

 ∂ef
∂e 
+ N ⋅ l 
P ⋅ q′ ⋅  M ⋅
∂A
∂A 



Similarly,

∂A *
=
∂v

  ∂q ∂e f
∂e f

∂w k
∂e 
∂ q ∂ e l   ∂ w l
∂a  
+
−
⋅N +
⋅K +
⋅ P ⋅ q ′ ⋅  M ⋅
+ N ⋅ l 
 P .


∂e l ∂ v   ∂ v
∂v
∂ s  
∂A
∂A 
  ∂ e f ∂ v

2


∂e f

∂e  
+ N ⋅ l  
 P ⋅ q ′ ⋅  M ⋅
∂A
∂ A  



 ∂e 
 ∂e  

∂ f 
∂ l  
(P ⋅ q[M ⋅ ef (F) + N ⋅ el (F)] − [wl (s, v) ⋅ N + wk (s, v) ⋅ K + a(s, v)])⋅ P ⋅ q′ ⋅  M ⋅  ∂A  + N ⋅  ∂A  
∂v
∂v





 < 0. (12)
−
2

 ∂e f
∂e 
+ N ⋅ l 
P ⋅ q′ ⋅  M ⋅
∂A
∂A 
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That is, higher slope and greater weather variation should lead to a decrease in the
profit maximizing farm size, respectively, in order to be consistent with the assumptions
of the size-decreasing effects of the nature-induced transaction costs. That is, nature,
namely slope and variation in the weather conditions, should affect the farm’s production
through two dimensions. First, it reduces the managerial returns to farmers’ efforts
exerted in the farming. Indeed, managing the working capital and labor over a high slope
land is costlier relative to the flatter ones. For climbing up and down to monitor the
laborers may require more effort and it reduces the managerial returns to the farmers’
efforts. High weather variance, particularly the variance of rain, may also require some
more managerial inputs relative to stable conditions. Seeking, tracking, and processing
weather information are costly tasks. The weather information system in Turkey has been
poor in the sense that there is no frequent and zip code based forecasting. Farmers
sometimes have to use the weather information which belongs to locations even 30-40
miles away. As noted earlier, while the variance of weather conditions can affect the
productivity directly through risk, it can increase the transaction costs when the outdoor
nature of farm production is taken care into account. When it rains, it sometimes rain for
weeks and farmers have to wait for a reasonable time to be able to run labor, machinery,
and draft animals on their lands. Additionally, high rain variation reduces contractual
performance and requires revisions and renegotiations and this comes with time and
money costs. Second, high slope and high weather (rain) variation increases the costs of
using the intermediate inputs for the farm production. Moving the stuff up and down the
hill is costlier in the sloppy areas relative to flatter ones. Minimum winter temperature
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affects the winter maintenance, for instance, that it requires proper dressing and shorter
work hours. The empirical analysis of this study will scrutinize the occurrence of these
effects on the hazelnut production in Turkey.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
So far, it has been argued that the transaction costs that come from natural effects
might limit the size of the hazelnut farms. The tests of this main theoretical prediction
through appropriate regression analyses are utilized through two separate data sets. The
first data set provides a snapshot of the characteristics of farmers, such as size of their
holdings, their income, working age family members, and so on, and is formed from a
survey that questioned 99 randomly selected individual farmers from the locations of
Unye, Fatsa, Caybasi, Ikizce, Akakoca, Duzce (merkez), Golyaka, Cilimli, Akcaabat,
Arsin, Vakfikebir, Bulancak, Eynesil, Kesap, Tirebolu, Trabzon (merkez), Giresun
(merkez), Terme, and Carsamba in the year 20068. The second data set consists of cross
sectional figures that come from hazelnut producing sub-provinces of Ordu (Merkez),
Akkus, Aybasti, Camas, Caybasi, Fatsa, Golkoy, Gurgentepe, Ikizce, Kabaduz, Kabatas,
Korgan, Kumru, Mesudiye, Persembe, Ulubey, Unye, Giresun (merkez), Bulancak,
Çanakçı, Dereli, Doğankent, Espiye, Eynesil, Görele, Keşap, Piraziz, Tirebolu, Duzce
(merkez), Akcakoca, Cilimli, Golyaka, Gumusova, Yigilca, Trabzon (merkez), Akcaabat,
Araklı, Arsin, Beşikdüzü, Çarşıbaşı, Çaykara, Dernekpazarı, Düzköy, Hayrat, Köprübaşı,
Maçka, Of, Sürmene, Şalpazarı, Tonya, Vakfıkebir, Yomra, Terme, and Carsamba. While
these sub-provinces constitute the majority of the production locations, the rest of the
locations were excluded from the analysis for data availability concerns. This data set
provides information about the natural, economic, and demographic characteristics of

8

See Appendix A for the summary statistics of the survey results.
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each location in order to explore the variation in farm size and natural effects across the
regions. Most of the regional data came from local agricultural offices. The data on
regional hazelnut production is collected from Fiskobirlik. The weather data came from
Turkish State Meteorological Service. Macroeconomic and demographic figures were
compiled from Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), State Planning Organization (DPT),
Central Bank of Turkey, and the local governor’s offices and websites. The other data
sources are Oregon Hazelnut Growers Union, The Black Sea Exporters Union, and
Hazelnut Promotion Group.
For the first data set about the individual farmer characteristics, one of the main
issues that had to be dealt with was the aggregation problem of farm size and total land
holdings of a farmer. However, farmers are observed to own lands at different locations.
Therefore, establishing a meaningful link between the natural effects that are associated
with a piece of land owned by a farmer and his total farm size would be impossible.
Sampath (1992), for instance, argues that total land area fails to reveal different
properties, such as irrigated and non-irrigated characteristics, of the lands. In the case of
hazelnut farming, farmers own lots at different locations with different properties.
Similarly, statistical data does not provide detailed information about each land segment
held by farmers. This problem has been relaxed by using the information about the
largest lot owned by a farmer as a proxy. Survey results show that the largest lots
constitute 49% of the total holdings per farmer on the average. When the individual
farmer characteristics are analyzed empirically, climate data from the regional data was
combined with this individual data set in order to reflect the effects of the natural effects

50

of the regions that the farmers live in. Using two separate data sets will allow the study to
make a cross check on the figures and regression analysis.
According to the survey results, mean farmer age is 51, mean tenure is 25,
families consist of 2-3 members, and they keep 1-2 animals, mostly for dairy needs as
mentioned earlier. Fifty seven percent of the farmers is found to have secondary job. This
high ratio is consistent with the arguments of this study that one of the “other”
determinants of the size of the hazelnut farms such as the tree-nut nature of the hazelnuts
does not require day by day care. This high ratio secondary occupation also raises
questions about the definition of a farmer and it is one of the sources of the debates that
pop up each year over the governmental support prices. Some argue that hazelnuts do not
require intensive year long care, unlike the other farmers hazelnut farmers can have
secondary occupations, and therefore hazelnut farming should be subsidized. Since the
effects of having a secondary job is taken into account in the empirical analysis, this
definition difficulty is not a major problem for this study. Mean family income is $16,247
with of that $7,320 is from non-hazelnut sources, consistent with having secondary jobs.
Twenty eight percent grows vegetables, fruits, or keep bees for income. While mean
family output is around 7,200 pounds; mean productivity is 295 pounds per acre.Twelve
percent keeps a draft animal, 24% owns a tractor (probably the light ones), and 49%
owns transportation. Only 26% had a recent technical support such as soil test, advice on
appropriate fertilizers, or pesticides. It has been stressed that land slope, a transaction
cost-increasing natural effect, is one of the main interest variables of this study. Since we
have no information on the number of separate lots owned by a farmer and their mean
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slope, the slope of the largest lot is used for a proxy along with other properties of the
largest lot. The mean slope of the largest lot is 27 degrees with a maximum of 70 degrees.
Regional data, however, reveals 32 degrees of mean slope and with a maximum of 47
degrees. Forty five percent the largest lots face the north. This is consistent with the
north-facing nature of the mountains in the Black Sea region. Fifty one percent of the
largest lots receive a river, lake, or sea effect. Mean distance from the sea is about 11-12
miles. Distance from the sea could be of an importance for two reasons. First, the sea
might have direct effects on productivity through wind, temperature, and rain. Second,
big cities, larger agricultural suppliers, agricultural offices, and major dealers are usually
located on the coastal lane. Assuming being close to a big city is advantageous,
transaction costs are higher for distant farmers. Mean altitude of the farms is 842 feet.
Mean fertilizer consumption is 1,700 pounds in a year and 38% of the farmers applied
organic fertilizers. Farmers have 5 trees per acre on their largest lots. Trees are basically a
productivity reducing factor because of their shadows. Mean distance between farms and
farm houses is about 1.7. This high distance is probably because some of the farmers live
in the city and commute their farms when they need to. This is also consistent with
having a secondary job. Farmers employ around 11 work days of labor per acre in a year.
While 45% of the labor need is met from outside hiring on average, 58% of the
harvesting is done by the family labor force. This is probably because all the family
members take their vacations during the harvesting time and come together from different
locations. Farmers own 1.9 acres of non-hazelnut land on average. This small amount
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shows there is no alternative (profitable) use of the land besides hazelnuts in the areas
where the survey is done.
In the regional data set, the main farm size is about 2.6 acres. Contrary to 9 acres
came out from the survey results; this figure is closer to the 3.65 acres provided by
TUGEM, Hazelnut Promotion Group, and Fiskobirlik. The noticeable difference in the
survey data figure may result from the fact that around 1/3 of the farmers questioned
were from Unye, one of the largest hazelnut producing sub-provinces. When the mean
family income is taken into account, the range of 2-4 acres per farmer seems to be
unrealistically small. However, there will always be measurement difficulties with this
figure because of the definition of the farmer, family head, number of family members
living together, and more importantly unreported lands. Farmers try to expand their
hazelnut lands by cultivating the Treasury or forest lands illegally and do not report them.
Therefore, survey data, supported with a reasonable annual income range, may provide a
more realistic figure of farm size9. In the regional data set, the mean altitude of the
hazelnut producing regions is about 1,450 feet. Mean distance from the sea is 15 miles
approximately. Mean productivity is 463 pounds. Mean land slope is about 32 degrees,
which is close to 27 degrees of the slopes of the largest lots in the farmers data. Besides
the slope data, regions have around 5% of flat lands. In the regions, 57% of the
population lived in the rural area (43% in the cities) in the year of 2000. The mean
variance of maximum temperature is 32.56; mean variance of minimum temperature is
50.31; mean variance of total rain 3,078; mean variance of average temperature is 38.56.
9

The government has been running a direct payment subsidy program for about 3 years. Farmers have to
report their actual lands in order to be eligible to get the benefits of the program. It is expected that more
accurate farmer data will come out after the results of this program is processed.
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Along with total monthly weather figures, these variance figures are very strong in a sense
that they were calculated as averages over 20-30 years for the majority of the regions. The
monthly break down of the data enables capturing the seasonal effects on different
development phases of the hazelnut trees in a year. Temperature during the pollination,
harshness of the winter, rains during the early development and temperature and rain during
the late development can affect the productivity of the hazelnuts directly and indirectly
through the transaction costs. Monthly break down of the data allows capturing these effects
and this has been taken into account during the empirical analysis. Since there were no
weather observation stations at each cross sectional unit, some of the weather data were used
interchangeably between the following locations based on 20-30 miles of maximum
geographical distance: Camas, Fatsa; Caybasi, Unye, Ikizce; Gurgentepe, Golkoy; Kabaduz,
Ulubey; Kabatas, Aybasti; Persembe, Ordu; Canakci, Dogankent; Dereli, Yavuzkemal;
Espiye, Tirebolu; Gorele, Eynesil; Piraziz, Bulancak; Cilimli, Duzce, Golyaka; Gumusova,
Hendek; Besikduzu, Vakfikebir, Carsibasi; Dernekpazari, Caykara, Koprubasi; Hayrat, Of,
Surmene; Salpazari, Tonya; Yomra, Arsin.
Theoretical assumptions of this study will be tested through the appropriate
regression analyses. Having cross sectional and individual data sets in hand, the OLS
(Ordinary Least Squares) seems to be the starting benchmark estimation method.
Smallness of the sample size of the both data sets and related possible complications,
such as heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, in the estimations will require appropriate
treatment of the OLS estimations, such as bootstrapping and instrumental variable (IV)
estimation methods.
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CHAPTER SIX
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
So far, it has been argued in this study that natural effects may increase
transaction costs and thus reduce the size of the hazelnut farms. The relevant data was
explained briefly in the previous chapter. In this chapter, two regression models are
estimated in order to verify if the assumptions about the relationship between the proxied
transaction costs and land size hold. While the first model analyzes the farm size using
the data on farmer characteristics, the second model utilizes the regional data for the
same purpose. After several trials, only the best models are reported here and relevant
variables explained in detail below.
It should be noted here that the wage rate, hazelnut price, the price of alternative
crops, institutional effects, such as the limitations on the inheritance and the transfer of
the hazelnut lands, and policy effects, such as tax and subsidy applications have been
assumed constant across the regions in all of the models.
Table-4 shows the results of the OLS, bootstrapped OLS, instrumental variable
(IV), and bootstrapped IV estimations of the following structural model on the
characteristics of the ith farmer in the sth location:
Y i,s = α + β1 productivityi,s + β2 tenure i + β3 tenuresquare i + β4 slope i,s + β5 rain
variance i,s + β6 amount rain in august i,s + ε i,s
While the survey data had 99 observations, estimations here use 88 observations
due to missing weather data for the two, Terme and Carsamba, of the locations.
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Table 4. OLS and IV Estimations on Farmer Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Size of the land holdings per farmer (acre, log)
OLS
Productivity (output/acre)
Tenure
Squared tenure
Slope
Variance of rain (log)
Amount of rain in August (log)
Constant
Observations
F-stat
White Chi_Sq(27) p=
White, Fitted Chi-Sq(2) p=
Pagan-Hall Test for IV Chi-Sq(7)
p=
B-P/C-W Test Chi-Sq(1) p=
Anderson Chi-Sq.(2) p=
Sargan Chi-Sq (1) p=
R-squared

Ω

-0.296*
(0.069)
0.038**
(0.018)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.036**
(0.014)
-1.083+
(0.631)
1.106**
(0.457)
6.988+
(3.706)
88
5.20
.99
.45

BTSTPDOLS
-0.296*
(0.071)
0.038**
(0.018)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.036**
(0.015)
-1.083+
(0.633)
1.106**
(0.442)
6.988+
(3.782)
88

IVREGΩ
-1.010*
(0.314)
0.050+
(0.027)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.063*
(0.024)
-2.067**
(1.012)
1.853**
(0.739)
14.405**
(6.247)
88

BTSTPDIVREG
-1.010*
(0.353)
0.050+
(0.027)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.063**
(0.029)
-2.067+
(1.115)
1.853**
(0.776)
14.405**
(7.243)
88

.99
.25
.09
.17

.09
.17

0.28
Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapped errors are robust.
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%

Instrumented
: Productivity
Included instruments : Slope, tenure, squared tenure, variance of rain, rain in August
Excluded instruments: Secondary occupation, percentage of outside labor use, owning a
tractor, owning a draft animal, distance of the largest lot from the
farmer’s residence.
Duplicates
:Tenure, squared tenure, slope, variance of rain, rain in August.
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In these estimations, dependent variable is the log of the hazelnut planted acres
owned by each farmer. The independent variable is the output per acre. Since the
dependent variable is in logs, productivity, which is basically the output divided by land
area, could not be used in logs. In the OLS estimation, productivity is significant and it
has a negative sign as expected based on the inverse relationship (IR) theory of land size
and productivity. As it will be seen below, productivity has a negative sign in all of the
estimations, implying a strong tendency toward the IR, which may mean that smaller
farms are more productive due to intensive use of labor. That is in the hazelnut farming in
Turkey, smaller the land size yields greater productivity. Tenure is the number of years
that the farmer keeps and operates his own land. The squared term of tenure is included
in the model in order to show if any nonlinear behavior of the land size holds regarding
the farm size. Squared tenure is insignificant yet has a negative sign implying a downturn
at a certain year of the tenure. Slope is one of the main interest variables of this study
since the transaction costs will be higher with the higher-slope lands. Slope is the average
land slope of the region that a farmer lives in and it is assumed to be uniformly
distributed within the regions. The slope of the largest lots has been used for the same
purpose, however, it has never been found significant in any of the estimations. Slope has
a significant negative sign, denoting that, holding other relevant factors constant, higher
the slope lower the farm size, as expected. Variance of rain is the log of the mean
variance of total rainfall in the regions that the farmers live in10. Considering it might be
correlated with minimum temperature, high rain variance would mean high risk and high
10

The rain and temperature data are assumed to be uniformly distributed within the regions and within the
days of the months.
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transaction costs through the instability of the wage contracts, and therefore reduces the
farm size. The variance of rain variable is statistically significant at the 10% significance
level and has a negative sign in the OLS estimation. Rain in August is the log of the rain
amount in August as averaged over 20-30 years. It is statistically significant at the 5%
level and implies that holding other factors constant, higher the amount of August rain
the larger the size of the hazelnut farms. This result is consistent with the idea that rains
close to harvesting may increase productivity since high temperature, tropical winds, and
drought reduces crop substantially in this period. Rain in September imposes transaction
costs since a majority of the farmers sun-dry the hazelnuts for about 7-15 days in this
month. However, the coefficient of a relevant variable, rain in September (in log), turned
out to be insignificant in all of the trials. It should be noted here that the timing of
harvesting and sun-drying may vary across the regions. Rain and temperature values are
assumed to be uniformly distributed within the regions and across the days of a month. In
fact, there are the chances that the whole amount of the rain might have fallen on a single
day and a narrow location in a particular month.
Based on the F-statistics, the OLS estimation seems to be statistically significant
as a whole and it seems it is not suffering from severe heteroscedasticity, which is a
common problem with the cross sectional analysis, based on the B-P Test, White (Fitted,
General) Test. However, running an OLS estimation on a reasonably small size of the
sample may cause small sample bias and a simulation may be required. For this purpose a
bootstrapped OLS estimation has been run in order to see if there is any significant
difference between the standard errors. As shown in Table-4’s third column, bootstrapped
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OLS estimation did not produce different standard errors and significance levels.
However, productivity in the OLS estimations could be endogenous and OLS estimation
might have produced biased coefficients. Therefore an IV (instrumental variable)
estimation has been run using the following variables: secondary occupation, the
percentage share of the outside-hired labor, owning a tractor, owning a draft animal, and
largest lot’s distance from the farmer’s house in order to get rid of a possible bias. As
shown in Table-4’s fourth column, IV estimation produced different coefficients and
different significance levels. While productivity had a coefficient of -.30 with the OLS
estimations, its value went down to -1.01 with the IV estimation but its significance level
has not changed. The coefficient of tenure went down to -.05 with a decrease in the
significance level as well. The coefficient of slope variable also went down but the slope
variable has become more significant statistically. The same has been observed with
variance of rain and rain in August. Instrumental variable estimation results show that
OLS estimations have produced biased coefficients. The Sargan test shows that the
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated model, i.e., error terms and the
instruments are uncorrelated. Anderson canonical correlations test rejects the null
hypothesis that the model is underidentified. The Pagan-Hall Test shows there is no
heteroscedasticity problem with the IV estimation. Due to the smallness of the sample
size, bootstrapping has also been applied to the IV estimation and no major changes in
the standard errors and significance levels have been observed. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the results of the IV estimation can be used for inferences in testing the
theoretical implications. Instrumental variable estimations yield that based on statistically
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significant coefficients and negative signs of the interest variables of slope and variance
of rain, holding other factors constant, higher transaction costs lead to lower farm sizes in
the hazelnut industry of Turkey. Particularly, holding other factors constant, 1 degree
increase in the land slope will lead to .063 percent decrease in the farm size; a 1 percent
increase in the variance of rain will lead to 2 percent decrease in the size of the hazelnut
farms.
Besides the models about the individual farmer characteristics, the relationship
between the farm size and transaction costs is tested with additional OLS and IV
estimations of the following structural model on regional farm characteristics.
Y = α + β1 productivity + β2 slope + β3 density + β4 urban population share + β5
minimum temperature in January February and March + β6 variance of rain + ε
Dependent variable in these estimations is the log of mean farm size within a subprovince. The results of these estimations are shown in Table-5 and the variable
description is as follows.
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Table 5. OLS and IV Estimations on Regional Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Mean land holdings within a region (acre, log)

Productivity (100 lb/acres)
Land slope
Population density (10/km2)
Share of urban population
Mean minimum temperature in January,
February, and March
Variance of rain (log)
Constant
Observations
F-stat
White Chi_Sq(27) p =
White, Fitted Chi-Sq(2) p =
Pagan-Hall Test for IV Chi-Sq(7) p =
B-P/C-W Test Chi-Sq(1) p =
Anderson Chi-Sq.(2) p =
Sargan Chi-Sq (1) p =
R-squared

OLS

BST-OLS

IVREG§

-0.049
(0.007)
-0.034*
(0.007)
-0.014*
(0.004)
0.796*
(0.217)

-0.049
(0.090)
-0.034*
(0.007)
-0.014**
(0.006)
0.796*
(0.269)

-0.103
(0.180)
-0.034*
(0.013)
-0.006*
(0.004)
0.739*
(0.221)

BSTIVREG§
-0.103
(0.450)
-0.034*
(0.012)
-0.006
(0.015)
0.739
(0.614)

0.086*

0.086*

0.092*

0.092**

(0.024)
-0.341**
(0.147)
6.063*
(1.382)
46
9.05
.07
.44

(0.024)
-0.341+
(0.171)
6.063*
(1.541)
46

(0.029)
-0.339**
(0.136)
6.285*
(1.457)
46

(0.045)
-0.339
(0.207)
6.285**
(2.601)
46

.80
.17
.033
.640

.033
.640

0.58

Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapped errors are robust.
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
§

Instrumented
: Productivity
Included instruments : Slope, population density, share of urban population, mean
minimum temperature in January, February, and March, and
variance of rain.
Excluded instruments : Minimum temperature in October and November, change in the
rural population share.
Duplicates
: Slope, population density, urban population share, mean
minimum temperature in January, February, and March, and
variance of rain.
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In these estimations, the dependent variable of productivity is mean productivity,
which is calculated as output divided by acres owned by the farmers in a particular
location. Since the dependent variable is in log terms, productivity could not be used in
log terms. While it has a negative sign, it is not statistically significant in the OLS
estimation as shown in the second column of Table-5. One of our interest explanatory
variables, slope, has a negative sign and its coefficient is statistically significant at 1%
significance level. Population density (10 persons/km2) has a negative sign, denoting that
the higher the population density the lower the farm size, ceteris paribus. This is
consistent with the intuition that populated areas will have smaller farm sizes. The
coefficient of the share of the urban population has a positive sign, as expected, and it is
statistically significant. That is, in the areas where more people live in the cities, farm
sizes are expected to be larger. The mean minimum temperature in January, February,
and March throughout 20-30 years for most of the regions has a positive sign, as
expected, and its coefficient is a statistically significant one, denoting that higher
minimum winter temperatures will lead to higher farm size. Considering one-night frosts
usually cause substantial crop losses each year, this variable has a particular importance
based on the assumption that colder winters signal a higher possibility of a one night
frost. Moreover, as it was mentioned earlier, colder temperatures increase the costs of
winter farm maintenance. Besides slope, variance of rain, which was calculated from the
amount of monthly rain for 20-30 years, is the other interest variable in terms of its
transaction costs-increasing effects. As expected, variance of rain has a negative sign and
its coefficient is statistically significant at 5% significance level denoting that in the areas
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where the rain variance is higher, farm sizes will be smaller, holding other relevant
factors constant.
The OLS estimation shown in the second column of Table-5 is significant as a
whole. As based on the F-test value of 9.05, it does not seem to suffer from severe
heteroscedasticity as based on the B-P and White-Fitted Tests, except for the WhiteGeneral Test that shows a heteroscedasticity at the 10% significance level. However, its
small sample size might cause a small sample bias and require a simulation in order to
verify that error terms are distributed normally. For this purpose a bootstrapped OLS has
been run and it generated slightly different standard errors and caused slight significance
level changes. Besides the estimation issues that might arise from smallness of the sample
size, endogeneity of productivity might cause biased coefficients. Therefore, an IV
estimation has been run using the instruments of the mean minimum temperature of the
months of October and November throughout 20-30 years, and change in the rural
population share from the year of 1990 to 2000. While the Sargan statistics shows that the
instruments are correctly excluded from the model, the Anderson canonical correlations
test rejects the null hypothesis that the model is under-identified. It basically implies that
holding other factors constant, 1 degree increase in slope will lead to a 0.03 percent
decrease in the farm size. The Pagan-Hall test rejects that the variance of the error terms
are not constant. The small sample size requires a bootstrapping on the IV estimation also
and it causes changes in the standard error and significance levels by verifying small
sample bias within the estimation. Based on the bootstrapped IV estimation results, it can
be inferred that 1 degree increase in the average slope of the region will lead to a .03
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percent decrease in the farm size. A 1 degree increase in the mean minimum temperature
of January, February, and March, will lead to .09 percent increase in the size of the
hazelnut farms. Besides the direct effects of winter temperature on the productivity, this
result is consistent with the expectation that winter maintenance will be costlier in the
colder areas. The coefficient of the variance of rain lost its significance after
bootstrapping the IV estimation. However, it still has a negative coefficient. In parallel
with the results from the estimations on individual farmer characteristics, these results
confirm our assumptions about the size decreasing effects of nature-induced transaction
costs.
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CONCLUSION
This study analyzes the determinants of the size of the hazelnut farms in Turkey
within the framework of the theory of firm and transaction costs. This study argues that
farm production is subject to natural effects depending on their location and natural
effects can increase the costs of using productive resources. Therefore, holding input
prices constant, the cross sectional variation in the farm size should come from the
variation of transaction costs. However, transaction costs are not easily measurable even
though they are considered during decision making. This study takes land slope and
variation in the weather conditions as proxies for transaction cost measurements that
assert higher land slope and rain, particularly, increase the costs of using farming inputs.
This link between the natural forces, transaction costs, and the farm size has been found
to be supported by the empirical analysis based on the OLS and IV estimations that
utilize individual and regional data sets. Negative significant relationships between the
land slope, weather variation, and farm size are the main findings of this study.
Besides, the study stressed the importance of crop characteristics, which is a
phenomenon that has been ignored in size and productivity analyses. In fact, the vulnerable
nature of hazelnut trees affect the nature of contracts and associated transaction costs, such
as monitoring costs, particularly, in the hazelnut farming. In this context, the study also
argued that lump-sum pay schedules are not necessarily inferior to piece rate or rank-order
tournament pay schedules under all circumstances. Moreover, the study highlighted
situations in which repeated dealings and trust ensure that contracts are based on the
expected performance rather than strict and continuous term-by-term monitoring.
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Appendix A
Farmer Survey Data Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Farmer’s age

99

51.52

12.68

24.00

91.00

Years owned his owned land

99

25.21

14.72

1.00

70.00

Number of family members

99

2.62

1.65

0.00

10.00

Number of animals kept

99

1.94

6.04

0.00

60.00

Secondary job (1,0)

99

0.57

0.50

0.00

1.00

If the farmer grows vegetables, fruit, keep bees for income (1,0)

99

0.28

0.45

0.00

1.00

Annual income ($)

99

16,247.66

19,853.59

1,481.48

148,148.10

Non-hazelnut income ($)

99

7,320.24

14,807.80

111.11

111,111.10

Hazelnut income ($)

99

8,927.42

5,045.79

1,370.37

37,037.00

Hazelnut acres

99

9.27

10.16

0.66

76.04

Total crop (lb.)

99

7,204.20

6,133.57

660.79

33,039.65

Productivity (lb./acres)

99

295.78

119.84

105.73

629.33

If a draft animal is owned (1,0)

99

0.12

0.33

0.00

1.00

If a tractor owned (1,0)

99

0.24

0.43

0.00

1.00

If a transportation owned (1,0)

99

0.49

0.50

0.00

1.00

If the farmer received a recent technical support (1,0)

99

0.26

0.44

0.00

1.00

The size of the largest lot (acres)

99

4.56

5.41

0.66

41.33

Slope of the largest lot

99

27.15

18.14

0.00

70.00

If the largest lot faces North (1,0)

99

0.45

0.50

0.00

1.00

If the largest lot is nearby a sea, river, and lake (1,0)

99

0.51

0.50

0.00

1.00

Distance from the sea (mile)

99

11.60

11.68

0.04

56.13

Altitute (ft.)

99

842.41

806.92

32.81

4,265.09

Amount of fertilizer used (lb.)

99

1,703.85

1,780.20

2.20

11,013.22

Amount of pesticides used (lb.)

92

31.66

39.35

0.00

220.26

If the farmer used organic fertilizers (1,0)

99

0.38

0.49

0.00

1.00

Number of trees affecting the largest lot

99

25.12

17.16

1.00

65.00

Total crop from the largest lot (lb.)

99

4,064.88

3,624.68

440.53

22,026.43

891.7583

669.8373

666.2562

533.005

Productivity of the largest lot (lb./acres)
Labor use number of work days (hired + family labor)

99

101.98

88.01

5.00

500.00

Largest lot’s distance from the farmers residence (mile)

99

1.69

5.89

0.00

46.77

Share of the outside labor use

99

45.26

40.86

2.00

100.00

Share of the harvesting done by family labor

99

58.13

40.26

5.00

100.00

Non hazelnut area (acres)

99

1.89

4.18

0.17

33.06
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Appendix B
Regional Data Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Mean farm size (acres)

52

2.59

1.45

0.34

6.54

Altitude (ft.)

52

1,453.25

1,502.19

1.00

5,872.00

Distance from the sea

52

15.44

15.26

1.00

58.80

Productivity of the region (lb./acre)

52

463.85

99.91

146.14

693.76

Population (2000)

52

11,438.15

6,062.58

221.00

19,800.00

Mean slope

52

31.80

9.65

10.00

46.80

Share of the flat areas

52

4.73

8.15

0.00

50.00

Per capita GDP (1996)

52

106.47

62.95

38.61

272.18

Population 1990

52

42,931.06

39,924.24

7,270.00

216,605.00

Urban population (1990)

52

18,118.56

27,396.69

2,250.00

161,886.00

Rural Population (1990)

52

24,812.50

17,222.21

4,394.00

74,522.00

Population (2000)

52

48,322.31

49,037.54

7,477.00

283,233.00

Population (1996)

52

45,626.68

44,366.71

7,698.50

249,919.00

Urban population (2000)

52

23,347.75

34,412.97

3,728.00

214,949.00

Rural population (2000)

52

24,974.56

20,202.66

3,019.00

103,041.00

Poulation change (%, 1996-2000)

52

7.89

15.74

-23.15

49.69

Urban poulation change (%, 1996-2000)

52

28.54

28.70

-30.50

95.17

Rural poulation change (%, 1996-2000)

52

-4.87

18.56

-46.79

37.62

Variance of average temperature

52

38.71

1.09

37.71

40.08

Variance of average rain

52

2,644.12

714.52

1,979.07

3,790.60

Population density

49

196.01

188.40

24.20

1,229.52

Urban population share (1990)

52

0.36

0.15

0.10

0.75

Rural population share (1990)

52

0.64

0.15

0.25

0.90

Urban population share (2000)

52

0.43

0.15

0.16

0.76

Rural population share (2000)

52

0.57

0.15

0.24

0.84

Change in rural population

52

-0.07

0.08

-0.32

0.12

Variance of maximum temperature

47

32.56

13.15

7.98

72.21

January minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

-4.34

4.16

-16.85

-0.10

February minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

-5.04

4.02

-16.43

-0.67

March minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

-3.03

3.45

-11.51

0.46

April minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

1.82

2.22

-3.50

4.09

May minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

4.93

2.76

-2.00

8.45

June minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

9.91

2.81

3.00

12.98

July minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

13.18

3.15

5.03

16.72

August minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

13.28

3.51

4.62

17.12

Sept. minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

9.25

3.46

2.17

13.19

October minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

4.94

3.09

-1.89

8.95

Nov. minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

0.61

3.20

-6.79

4.34

Dec. minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

-2.91

3.86

-14.02

1.61

Jan. minimum temperature (average of 20-30 yrs.)

51

49.78

6.65

39.38

79.93
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